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Most of the papers prepared for this conference make clear the desirable 
economic effects if older Americans worked longer and spent fewer years 
in retirement. Despite a small upturn in labor market participation by 
older workers in recent years, there is substantial room for signiﬁ  cantly 
greater movement in this direction. The public policy framework is a 
major determinant of when Americans decide to retire.1 Both workers 
and employers take some account of the rules related to retirement that 
are present in the Social Security laws, tax laws, and regulations govern-
ing private pension plans and individual retirement savings. This paper 
addresses the issue of whether the current set of laws can be changed to 
provide fewer incentives to retire early and offer more encouragement to 
work longer.2 
I.  The Current Policy Regime Favors Early Retirement
The current legal and institutional framework in the United States is 
highly favorable to early retirement. Public policy does far less than it 
could to encourage older workers to stay in the labor force and ﬁ  rms to 
employ older workers. Social Security basically allows workers to retire 
at age 62 (which about 55 percent of Americans currently choose to do) 
and the vast majority (about 75 percent ) do retire under Social Security 
before the normal retirement age of 65 years. About another 20 percent 
retire at age 65, and at present very few workers (about 5 percent ) work 
beyond the normal retirement age. Moreover, Medicare beneﬁ  ts are pro-
vided at age 65 (and, in the case of disability, at earlier ages). Pensions 
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further inducement to retire earlier rather than “later.” Indeed, the shift 
from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t to deﬁ  ned contribution plans makes what assets are 
accumulated available at even earlier ages.
The Social Security system was not intentionally designed to favor early 
retirement. The system currently in place has resulted from a historical 
evolution of almost random political decisions and changing economic 
and societal circumstances. In 1935, when Social Security was enacted, 
the retirement age of 65 years was adopted without a great deal of debate 
or rationale, and only a small percentage of workers at that time sur-
vived beyond that age. Since the mid-1930s, life expectancies have grown 
steadily but the normal retirement age has only been adjusted once. In 
1983, largely to help restore Social Security’s ﬁ  nancial solvency, the nor-
mal retirement age was raised to 67 years, albeit with a very long transition 
over 40 years. The change to age 67, which will affect birth cohorts born 
in 1960 and later, did not fully reﬂ  ect the growth in life expectancy that 
had taken place over recent decades, nor was there any attempt to index 
the retirement age to take account of future expected gains in longevity. 
In 1956, early retirement at age 62 was provided for women (and 
the beneﬁ  t formula enhanced), but this was at a time when there were 
relatively few women in the labor force. Men were allowed to retire at 
age 62 in 1961 as a response to arguments for equitable treatment and 
the recession in the late 1950s. These were piecemeal beneﬁ  t enhance-
ments provided without a full appreciation of the possible long-term 
consequences. 
Signiﬁ  cantly, the early retirement age of 62 years was not changed in 
1983, when the normal retirement age was raised to age 67. Although 
the possibility was considered, the increase was not seen as relevant to 
the system’s solvency, the motivating consideration of the legislation, nor 
worth the political cost. In the case of early retirement at age 62, an actu-
arially fair reduction of the normal beneﬁ  t was provided, which reduced 
somewhat the incentive for early retirement, as did the amendments to 
the retirement test and the addition of the delayed retirement credit. The 
labor market implications of leaving the early retirement age unchanged 
were not seriously addressed. 
There have been recent changes in the current policy regime, making 
it somewhat less favorable to take early retirement. As the normal retire-
ment age rises from 65 to 67, the beneﬁ  ts for early retirees are reduced. 
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For example, when fully phased in, the beneﬁ  t at age 62 will be reduced 
from 80 percent of the normal beneﬁ  t to 70 percent. The retirement 
earnings test has been liberalized so that after the normal retirement age 
individuals can work and retain their earnings without penalty. The law 
increasingly provides an actuarially fair delayed retirement credit for 
workers who choose to work after the normal retirement age. When fully 
phased in, an additional 8 percent will be provided for each additional 
year of work up to ﬁ  ve years. Thus, the normal beneﬁ  t can be increased 
40 percent by working ﬁ  ve years longer. 
All of these provisions are in the process of being phased in, however, 
and, to a great extent, constitute “stealth” changes because of the lack of 
publicity about what is happening over the long transitions. This gradual 
implementation means that there are no dramatic changes at any given 
moment to inﬂ  uence behavior in a signiﬁ  cant way. For example, if the 
beneﬁ  t at age 70–72 years was highlighted as the “full” beneﬁ  t attain-
able, it could be pointed out that the early beneﬁ  t at age 62 is only 50 
percent of that amount (rather than 70–80 percent of the normal beneﬁ  t). 
Nonetheless, in the ﬁ  nal analysis, even after all the presently legislated 
changes are fully operative, the Social Security regime will continue to be 
highly favorable to early retirement. 
II.  Possible Directions for Legislative Changes to Encourage Later 
Retirement
It would be possible to speed up the transitions to previously enacted 
later retirement ages. It would also be possible to speed up the delayed 
retirement credit changes. The beneﬁ  t formula could also be changed to 
provide enhancements for continued labor force participation (wages are 
now indexed only to 60 years of age, and work beyond this age rarely 
improves a person’s ultimate beneﬁ  t entitlement). But the major change 
that could make a large difference would be to move the early retirement 
eligibility age from 62 to 65 years, albeit with an appropriately timed 
transition phase. 
A change in the eligibility age for early retirement would almost neces-
sarily have to be part of a larger package of adjustments, probably includ-
ing further changes in the normal retirement age, perhaps to 70 years of 
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might include easing the requirements for disability beneﬁ  ts for workers 
aged 62 to 65 years, and providing a signiﬁ  cant minimum beneﬁ  t for 
lower-wage workers and others who would be adversely affected by the 
changes in the early retirement age and the normal retirement age.
It would also be possible to provide tax credits for employers to hire 
older workers, perhaps through a remission of the employer’s share of 
the Social Security taxes that would otherwise be imposed. Further, a 
tax beneﬁ  t could be provided to older workers by remitting their share 
of Social Security taxes. Income tax credits and allowances could also 
be provided to employers and workers. In other words, given the politi-
cal will to change the laws to encourage later retirement, it would be 
entirely possible to provide greatly enhanced incentives for older workers 
to remain in the active labor force and for employers to employ these 
seasoned workers. 
III.  Why the Prospects are Dim for Major Legislative Changes
What is the likelihood of enacting legislative developments that establish 
a public policy framework that is more responsive to the realities of the 
circumstances facing older Americans in the future and confronting the 
national economy?
To review the history, the Social Security program was established 
in the 1930s, reconstituted in the 1950s, and expanded in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Congress adjusted the system in the early 1980s. Yet since 
the disability reforms enacted in 1980 and major old-age and survivor 
reforms enacted in 1983, there have not been further changes with the 
same degree of policy signiﬁ  cance. Despite the Social Security ﬁ  nancing 
issues stemming from projected long-term deﬁ  cits, which ﬁ  rst became 
very apparent in the early 1990s, the political conditions for signiﬁ  cant 
Social Security change have not been present for almost 25 years. The 
program has largely remained static while the U.S. economy and society 
have changed dramatically. 
Since 1983, the closest we have come to a major Social Security bill 
was during President Clinton’s second term, when he held a series of 
policy forums across the country and began to assemble popular sup-
port for a major reform package. These changes would have involved 
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restoring long-term ﬁ  nancial stability to the traditional Social Security 
program while introducing the concept of an individual account system, 
possibly as an add-on to the traditional system with some subsidization 
of contributions for lower-income workers. The federal budget surpluses 
then projected from the vantage point of the late 1990s could have been 
used to help ﬁ  nance these changes. However, once Clinton’s personal 
difﬁ  culties began to emerge and he became reliant on the more liberal 
House Democrats during the impeachment proceedings, the congression-
al support for such a package collapsed. Liberals would not support the 
addition of an individual account system and conservatives would not 
support changes needed to ensure the long-term ﬁ  nancing of the tradi-
tional system. The opportunity to modernize the program and reset it for 
the twenty-ﬁ  rst century was lost.
During his ﬁ  rst term President Bush put a great deal of energy into 
seeking Social Security reform that would have introduced an individual 
account system. However, many viewed his approach as substantially 
undermining the traditional Social Security system, and his proposals 
never received the popular acceptance and broad bipartisan support in 
Congress that would be required for such a major overhaul. His adamant 
persistence after the battle was lost produced adamant opposition, with 
the result that individual account possibilities may have been doomed for 
the foreseeable future. This highly partisan experience has clearly post-
poned any signiﬁ  cant opportunity for major Social Security reform until 
the next presidential administration, at the earliest.
It is important to understand that the problems of the current Social 
Security system go well beyond the issues of early retirement incentives 
and long-term solvency. The system has not been modernized and adapted 
to current societal conditions—it is a mid-twentieth century framework 
that does not mirror the realities of the twenty-ﬁ  rst century. For example, 
family beneﬁ  ts for spouses and dependents need to be reconsidered in the 
light of the greater participation of women in the workforce, increases 
in the rate of divorce, and the greater diversity of family patterns. The 
program’s entire structure and its administration need to be thoughtfully 
reviewed. In short, a comprehensive reform package designed to make 
the system sound now and in the future is in order—a challenge for some 
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The political sensitivity of addressing the early retirement issue is par-
ticularly intense, as the reform efforts of the late Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan (D-NY) reveal. Moynihan was the leading champion of Social 
Security during a long and distinguished Senate career, which culminated 
in his chairing the Finance Committee, which has jurisdiction over Social 
Security and Medicare. He developed a comprehensive reform bill dur-
ing the late 1990s as he approached retirement and reﬂ  ected on how to 
set the system on the right course for the future. The bill retained 62 
years as the early retirement age, and eliminated the retirement earnings 
test at this age, even as it substantially raised the normal retirement age 
and provided for increases in Social Security taxes to restore the system’s 
long-term solvency. Moynihan’s rationale for retaining the early retire-
ment age at 62 years was to maximize choice for individual workers, 
although it was apparent that based on a later normal retirement age, 
with the larger actuarial reduction of the early beneﬁ  t, many workers 
taking early retirement would receive lower beneﬁ  ts, and that if some 
lived long enough, that shortfall could possibly lead to providing Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) (means-tested beneﬁ  ts) in greater amounts.
Moynihan’s bill, however, would have introduced an individual account 
system within the Social Security system that allowed workers to achieve 
more adequate beneﬁ  ts on an individual self-help basis. Moynihan broke 
with the program’s traditional rationale, which had emphasized from the 
mid–1930s the priority of providing beneﬁ  t “adequacy,” in the tradi-
tional system. This was a goal that some felt had only been achieved in 
1972, some 37 years after the program began, when beneﬁ  ts were raised 
substantially and indexed for inﬂ  ation.
A fallacy of the Moynihan position, to my mind, is that the very work-
ers who will opt for the early beneﬁ  t are likely to be ones who cannot 
afford to build up supplementary individual account accumulations or 
will not want to do so. Furthermore, making larger numbers of workers 
dependent on SSI would likely undermine the program in the long run 
(since it could make means-testing other aspects of the program a shorter 
step).
Looking to an individual account system within Social Security to 
compensate for an inadequate beneﬁ  t structure also neglects the fact that 
there are numerous opportunities for individual savings outside of the 
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Social Security program that lower income workers do not adequately 
utilize. While there might be some greater attraction for saving in an 
individual account system that is part of the Social Security system, it 
is far from certain how effective this solution might be, particularly for 
low-income workers, in a period in which the Social Security Administra-
tion manifests serious shortcomings in service delivery and government 
programs in general are on the defensive. 
In summary, the point here is not to disparage Senator Moynihan’s 
efforts, but to underscore the political difﬁ  culty of raising the early retire-
ment age that is currently in place. Since this benchmark interacts with 
other important components of the U.S. retirement system, a compre-
hensive package of balanced reforms designed to better adapt the Social 
Security program to current socioeconomic conditions should deal ade-
quately with all these components in order to make a later retirement age 
more attractive and feasible for a signiﬁ  cant number of older workers. 
The 1983 Social Security reforms and the 1986 tax reforms under 
President Reagan remain models for principled changes to these large 
systems. These reforms involved bipartisan, balanced packages, based on 
a great deal of preparation, and deft management of the political process 
over an extended period of time. While neither reform package fully real-
ized the policy goals of their major sponsors, and the achievements of 
both degenerated subsequently, these efforts accomplished a great deal 
at the time and could have been platforms for further reform if there had 
been continuity in the political will for more reform. Assuming that this 
type of broad support and bipartisan cooperation are the fundamental 
political conditions necessary for any substantial future reforms of the 
Social Security and tax systems, the question is whether it is realistic to 
expect such conditions to emerge anytime soon. Currently, the partisan-
ship in Congress and the polarized nature of political discourse makes it 
seem unlikely that such a consensus would emerge. Thus, it seems unre-
alistic to expect that in the near term a major Social Security bill might be 
enacted that would substantially change the incentives for older workers 
and employers.3 
In truth, over the last few decades government institutions may be seen 
as having weakened in terms of the ability to respond constructively to 
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ment and the policymaking process has given way frequently to ideo-
logical formulations and crass political calculations. Major progressive 
reforms are difﬁ  cult to achieve and are less frequently undertaken, espe-
cially when the gains are very long term, but the political election cycle 
runs on a short-term schedule. 
IV.  Why the Prospects for Marginal Legislative Changes are More 
Likely
At this point in time, healthcare issues may well be the key to where 
the reconsideration of the public policy framework on entitlement pro-
grams develops. The costs of healthcare are rising and its accessibility is 
diminishing for all Americans. The costs of Medicare are rising and the 
Social Security cash beneﬁ  t will inevitably be diminished over time as 
the rapidly growing Medicare Part B and Part D premiums are deducted 
from monthly Social Security payments. Private employers are curtailing 
healthcare beneﬁ  ts, particularly for retired workers, but employed work-
ers are increasingly affected too. Healthcare costs are increasingly a prob-
lem in employing older workers. Pension provision has largely shifted 
from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans to providing deﬁ  ned contribution plans, and 
there are increasingly generous provisions for allowing employees to take 
their accumulations long before retirement, often when they change jobs 
at relatively early ages. 
All the presidential candidates presently are endorsing major healthcare 
reform and it seems likely that as we draw closer to the 2008 election the 
political imperatives for change will intensify. The Medicare Prescription 
Drug Improvement and Modernization Act enacted in November 2003 
under George W. Bush presents many problems as it becomes more fully 
implemented, and undoubtedly there will be an effort to reconsider this 
law as part of healthcare reform. The Medicare Part D drug beneﬁ  t will 
almost certainly need to be changed, as will many other aspects of the 
Medicare program.  
Any legislation designed to reform how healthcare is provided in the 
United States will probably not thoroughly consider how such reforms 
might lead to workers being encouraged to stay in the labor force lon-
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ger, and how this might affect ﬁ  rms employing older workers. Nonethe-
less, enacting healthcare reform clearly could provide the opportunity 
to change the incentives that would encourage longer working lives for 
many Americans. For example, to relieve the burden on employers of 
hiring older workers, Medicare could be made the primary (rather than 
secondary) payer of beneﬁ  ts for workers above age 65.  
It is also possible, however, that additional incremental changes will 
tilt the U.S. retirement regime even further toward taking early retire-
ment. Changes in the Medicare system could allow a buy-in before 65 
years of age to make health insurance available to those who are not 
yet eligible for Medicare. It was a popular reform to eliminate the Social 
Security earnings test, and the earnings test could also be repealed for 
retirees under 65 years of age. Such a change might actually increase the 
number of early retirees who continue to work.
In general, it is easier to extend beneﬁ  ts than to curtail or eliminate 
these entitlements, which means that politicians seeking to do something 
in the ﬁ  eld of Social Security and Medicare could well make the policy 
regime even more favorable to early retirement. Elderly Americans vote 
in larger numbers than do other age groups and are very important politi-
cally. As a result, incremental changes that favor older workers could 
be attractive, particularly if these reforms seem to involve manageable 
budgetary costs. 
V.  Real Events are Likely to be More Inﬂ  uential Than Changes in 
Laws, and Could Lead to Constructive Legislative Change
It seems unlikely that Social Security reform will emerge as a major leg-
islative issue until the ﬁ  nancing problems become even more acute than 
at present. Thus, the current public policy regime is unlikely to be greatly 
changed in the near term. The “social engineering” approaches in the 
1983 Social Security Act and the 1986 Tax Reform Act are unlikely to be 
achieved in the near future because of a highly partisan political environ-
ment. This means that real events in the economy are more likely than 
any changes in the public policy framework to inﬂ  uence employees to 
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in prevailing economic conditions could stimulate changes in private sec-
tor behavior. If the economy falters and wealth prospects are diminished, 
so that individuals feel more insecure, there could be an impetus for 
working longer. On the other hand, if the economy continues to prosper, 
the stock market continues to do well, and the housing market remains 
relatively strong, workers may well accumulate wealth that leads to early 
retirement. 
On the employer side, if major labor shortages emerge, perhaps because 
immigration is curtailed and outsourcing is restricted, ﬁ  rms may need 
to adjust to a diminished labor supply by taking steps to employ older 
workers that previously they might not have seriously considered hir-
ing. Older workers are likely to want more ﬂ  exibility and even part-time 
jobs. Here, a precedent that may be instructive is the way employers in 
many areas have adapted their practices to encourage women to work. 
In many cases, women have required more ﬂ  exible work schedules and 
conditions of employment, including part-time opportunities at certain 
times in their work lives. Employment conditions can be changed if there 
is a desire to do so, and older workers would likely respond to encour-
agement from employers who provide greater incentives adapted to their 
particular needs.
The changing structure of the U.S. economy, which now is more ori-
ented around industries providing services and knowledge, often involves 
less physically demanding labor, and this should enable older workers to 
stay in the workforce longer; in some instances this already seems to be 
occurring. It is also the case, however, that the newer 24/7 service econ-
omy often produces more stresses and strains and there can be greater 
worker “burn-out.” In addition, some employers such as large law and 
accounting ﬁ  rms increasingly enable, and often force, their workers to 
retire at early ages in order to allow younger lawyers and accountants to 
rise within the ﬁ  rms. These are highly competitive ﬁ  elds where the ﬁ  rms 
do better by keeping their workforce young. 
Another factor favoring younger workers is generational. The com-
puter and digital revolution requires the constant learning of new skills. 
Older workers often have difﬁ  culty with this retooling process. It is pos-
sible that younger generations that are more computer literate, techni-
341 Stanford G. Ross
cally educated and well-trained, will ﬁ  nd it easier to adapt and keep up 
with the rapidly changing technology that is at the heart of much of the 
contemporary economy. 
All of these variables make it difﬁ  cult to predict whether it will be eas-
ier for older workers to stay in the labor force longer, and for employers 
to better use the skills and experience that older workers can provide.
In the ﬁ  nal analysis, changes in real economic and social conditions 
may lead to changes in the public policy framework as the private sector 
seeks legislative changes that can help it to adapt to changing circum-
stances. Over time the laws could be changed to enable workers to work 
longer and employers to employ older workers, and the economy would 
beneﬁ  t from this increased labor supply. In other words, this could be a 
subject for which change is stimulated from the grassroots level, rather 
than by the policy establishment. 
But the political will for enacting these changes does not seem present 
now because neither U.S. employers nor aging workers and the orga-
nizations that represent them seem particularly motivated to seek such 
changes. Employers and the institutions that represent their business 
interests seem to give priority to easing immigration requirements for 
high-tech workers and other prime-age workers from abroad. In fact, 
aging workers and the organizations that represent them often see early 
retirement opportunities as important to preserve and enhance. It will 
take a massive educational effort to ready the aging U.S. population for 
the economic realities they will face going forward. 
Notes
1. The public policy framework is only one aspect of a complex situation, and 
what workers and employers actually do depends on a variety of economic and 
social factors. The public policy framework can be important beyond immediate 
pecuniary aspects in setting expectations for workers and employers. Non-pe-
cuniary considerations appear to matter a great deal in inﬂ  uencing retirement 
behavior. There is considerable evidence that workers often make retirement deci-
sions that are ﬁ  nancially disadvantageous to their self-interests. Another factor is 
the information used in making retirement decisions is often inaccurate or incom-
plete. The government’s role, particularly the Social Security Administration and 
Medicare, in providing useful information, and at times analysis and advice, is a 
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2. The larger question of whether people should work longer at the expense of 
greater leisure is not addressed. For any individual, the choice between work and 
leisure is a personal decision. For the society as a whole, it is a value judgment. 
This comment simply assumes that greater productivity is a public good from an 
economic standpoint.
3.  In a related issue, the disability system is inconsistent in its goals, unfair in its 
results, and uneven in its administration. Considering its $110 billion annual pro-
gram cost, and $8 billion administrative cost, it is in imperative need of substan-
tive and procedural reform. But without the fundamental conditions for major 
reform being present, little can be expected to happen legislatively.
The Seven Deadly Sins in Aging Policy 
and Research: A Cautionary List for 
Policymakers and Prognosticators
C. Eugene Steuerle
Pride, envy, gluttony, lust, anger, greed, and sloth—theologians tell us 
that we become better people by examining these sources of failure. 
But my concern here is not with the classic seven deadly sins, but what 
I feel are the contemporary seven deadly sins being committed in current 
policy and research on aging.  Reﬂ  ecting on them likewise provides some 
warning signs for us acting as policymakers, researchers, or prognostica-
tors. 
I am not, of course, going to accuse any particular person of commit-
ting the sins I am about to discuss, since I am well aware of the Biblical 
injunction that only one who is without sin in these matters is allowed 
to cast stones.  More to the point, these shortcomings, some of omission 
and some of commission, are social sins: these overlay the macroeco-
nomic debate on aging even when some of us researchers and policymak-
ers claim personally at a micro-level to have avoided them. Finally, I am 
sure that some of you have different religious training, and will decide 
that some of what I label “sins” are actually virtues. 
Deadly Sin # 1: Giving Too Little Attention to the Labor Side of the 
Aging Debate
The ﬁ  rst deadly sin is paying too little attention to the labor (as opposed 
to capital) side of the aging debate. By listing this ﬁ  rst, I am obviously 
preaching to the choir assembled here. I congratulate Cathy Minehan, 
Bob Triest, and their Boston Fed colleagues for their leadership in taking 
on this most important, yet usually neglected, issue in the aging policy 
debate.